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Bit commitment (BC) is an important cryptographic primitive
for an agent to convince a mutually mistrustful party that she has
already made a binding choice of 0 or 1 but only to reveal her
choice at a later time. Ideally, a BC protocol should be simple,
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reliable, easy to implement using existing technologies, and most
importantly unconditionally secure in the sense that its security is
based on an information-theoretic proof rather than computational
complexity assumption or the existence of a trustworthy arbitra-
tor. Here we report such a provably secure scheme involving only
one-way classical communications whose unconditional security is
based on no superluminal signaling (NSS). Our scheme is inspired
by the earlier works by Kent, who proposed two impractical rela-
tivistic protocols whose unconditional securities are yet to be es-
tablished as well as several provably unconditionally secure proto-
cols which rely on both quantum mechanics and NSS. Our scheme
is conceptually simple and shows for the first time that quantum
communication is not needed to achieve unconditional security for
BC. Moreover, with purely classical communications, our scheme
is practical and easy to implement with existing telecom technolo-
gies. This completes the cycle of study of unconditionally secure
bit commitment based on known physical laws.
Bit commitment is a two step cryptographic primitive between two mis-
trustful parties conventionally called Alice and Bob. In the commitment
phase (CP), Alice gives an evidence to Bob as a guarantee that she has com-
mitted her choice of 0 or 1. And in the revealing phase (RP), she discloses
her choice to Bob. This primitive has to be perfectly binding in the sense
that if Alice changes her mind after the CP, she will escape detection with
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conditional probability no more than a fixed small security parameter ǫ > 0.
It must also be perfectly concealing in the sense that Bob has no information
on the value of the committed bit before the RP1. BC is an essential cryp-
tographic primitive for a variety of useful cryptographic applications such as
secure coin tossing over the Internet, digital signature and zero-knowledge
proof1.
The best possible BC protocol should be unconditionally secure in the
sense that its security is information-theoretic and do not rely on computa-
tional complexity assumptions (such as the existence of one-way function),
technological assumptions (such as the hardness of building a quantum com-
puter) or the existence of a trustworthy arbitrator. Surely, we also prefer a
protocol that can be easily, efficiently and reliably implemented using exist-
ing technologies whose security is based on the validity of as few physical
laws and mathematical theorems as possible. Unfortunately, all BC schemes
based on transmission of classical information in non-relativistic setting can-
not be unconditionally secure. For a while, people believed that quantum
mechanics alone could come to rescue. But this hope was dashed by the
works of Mayers2 as well as Lo and Chau3, who showed that unconditionally
secure BC scheme based on quantum mechanics alone do not exist.
On several occasions, Kent came close to finding the “ideal” BC protocol.
He discovered a BC scheme in 1999 (K99) in which Alice and Bob exchange
classical signals traveling at light speed in Minkowski spacetime4. He further
introduced a similar scheme in 2005 (K05) which involves multiple coopera-
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tive verifiers5. He showed that these schemes are provably secure against all
classical attacks as well as quantum attacks used by Mayers and Lo-Chau.
And he believed that these two schemes are unconditionally secure although
he could not come up with proofs. Nevertheless, they are impractical be-
cause the amount of communication needed in K99 scales exponentially with
the waiting time to reveal the commitment4 and Alice has to agree on the
commitment timing between spacelike separated agents in K055.
In search of the origin of security in BC, Cre´peau6 and Winter et al.7
proved that unconditionally secure BC is possible by transmission of clas-
sical signals over certain noisy channels under the rather artificial condi-
tion that no error correction is performed. Winkler et al.8 showed that
local or nonlocal correlations can be used to construct unconditionally se-
cure BC even in the absence of signaling provided that Alice and Bob trust
the source of these correlations. A more satisfactory solution without these
rather ad doc assumptions was found by Kent in 2011 who discovered a
unconditionally secure BC protocol in Minkowski spacetime that requires
the transmission of quantum particles9. An interesting feature of this pro-
tocol which departs from traditional BC is that the commitment time is
pre-determined by the distances between Bob and the two verifiers. Using
this protocol as a blueprint, Kent introduced a more practical uncondition-
ally secure quantum BC in 2012 (K12)10. The unconditional securities of
these two protocols9,10,11,12 follow from the no cloning theorem in quantum
mechanics13,14 as well as NSS in special relativity15. The need of quantum
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communication means that these protocols are technologically challenging
to implement. Overcoming the challenge, two groups have experimentally
demonstrated the feasibility of variations of K12 with commitment times of
15 ms16 and 30 µs17, respectively.
Since quantum communication is only used in the beginning part of K12,
it is natural to ask if it can be eliminated completely so that the uncondi-
tional security will be based solely on NSS. Here we show how this can be
done. Our scheme, therefore, shows that quantum mechanics is not required
to guarantee unconditional security in BC. Moreover, this purely classical
protocol is much easier to implement using mature existing telecom tech-
nologies. Our work also shines light on the computational capabilities of
different models of quantum causalities18 and nonlocalities19.
Similar to K12, our protocol requires Alice to have N ≥ 2 agents in
Minkowski space labeled Alice1 up to AliceN with N = ⌈log2(1+1/ǫ)⌉, where
ǫ > 0 is the small fixed security parameter in our protocol. Moreover, each
of the Alice agents is spatially located close to an agent of Bob, labeled Bob1
up to BobN . As shown in figure 1, each Alicej has two unjammable classical
authenticated secure one-way communication channels that can transfer sig-
nals close to the speed of light — one uses to receive information from Alice
and the other to send information to Bobj. The unconditional security of the
information passing through each channel can be guaranteed, for instance,
by using one-time pad through the pre-shared secret key between agents at
the two ends of the channel20. For simplicity, we assume that all channels
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are noiseless. (We shall discuss the noisy situation later on.) In the CP,
Alice commits to a bit value i at spacetime point Aµ by sending i to every
Alicej through the corresponding secure communication channel. The RP
begins when Alicej receives the bit value i from Alice at distinct spacetime
point Aµj . She will immediately copy it down and forward it to the nearby
Bobj through a secure channel. Bob will accept the commitment provided
that the forwarded messages received by all Bobj’s at spacetime point Bµj ’s
are equal. Here we require Bµj ’s to be space-like separated.
time
Bob1
Bob2
Alice1
Alice2
AliceN Bob N
Alice
A
space
1
B
2
1B
B
N
µ
µ µA
A2µ
µ
ANµ
µ
Figure 1: Schematic representation of our protocol with unjammable classical
authenticated secure one-way communication channels linking Alice to Alicej
and Alicej to Bobj. The dashed circles indicate secure spacetime regions
controlled by the respective agents. Note that the detailed physical structures
of each channel, whether they are fiber-based or free space with or without
relay stations in between, does not matter. Indeed, our scheme is perfectly
compatible with standard telecom infrastructure.
Our scheme combines the advantages and eliminates the disadvantages of
K05 and K12— for it requires only classical one-way communications and can
be reliably implemented using existing technologies by removing all quantum
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communications and measurements in K12. Moreover, the simplicity of this
scheme enables us to analyze its security with ease.
Since all communications are unconditionally secure, Bob’s agents have
no information on the committed bit before the RP even if they cheat. Thus,
our scheme is perfectly concealing.
We use two example strategies to clarify the meaning of cheating before
analyzing the security of our scheme against dishonest Alice and her agents.
In example I, each Alicej always negates the committed bit i received from
Alice before forwarding it to Bobj. This strategy is equivalent to always
committing to the negated bit i¯. In example II, each Alicej forwards the
standard basis measurement result of a pre-shared generalized GHZ state to
Bobj. This is equivalent to Alice committing to a random bit. We emphasize
that both strategies should be regarded as honest commitment strategies by
Alice based on her information and decision at spacetime point Aµ with some
of Alice’s action being delayed to a later time and executed by Alicej’s on
Alice’s behalf. In contrast, a genuine cheating strategy should enable Alice or
her agents to decide whether to cheat or not based on additional information
available to them at a later time. Besides, no matter to negate or not, she
will escape Bob’s detection with a high conditional probability.
Since Bµj ’s are space-like separated, the time coordinate of the apex of
the joint past lightcones of Bµj and B
µ
k equals tjk = (B
0
j +B
0
k − |
~Bj − ~Bk|)/2.
Recall that by NSS, it is impossible to transmit non-zero amount of informa-
tion between two space-like separated points in Minkowski space even with
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prior shared classical correlation or quantum entanglement15. In the time
interval I = (maxj 6=k tjk,minj B
0
j ], Alicej is on the past lightcone of B
µ
j or in
its interior; hence, all Alicej’s are space-like separated. Consequently, Alicej
cannot communicate to Alicek in time based on additional information avail-
able to her after time tjk even if they share prior quantum entanglement for
all k 6= j. Thus, all genuine cheating strategy that can make use of later time
information during the RP must be uncorrelated strategies used by Alicej’s.
Since each agent of Bob receives one classical bit concerning the value
of Alice’s commitment in the RP, all genuine cheating strategies are those
for each Alicej to independently negate the committed bit received from
Alice with probability pj. Consequently, the maximum possible conditional
probability of successful cheating by Alice’s agents Pr is given by
Pr = max
(pj)
min
[ ∏N
j=1 pj
1−
∏N
j=1(1− pj)
,
∏N
j=1(1− pj)
1−
∏N
j=1 pj
]
. (1)
Note that the first (second) term of equation (1) is the conditional probability
of escaping Bob’s detection should Alice decided to negate (not to negate)
the committed bit. Also the maximization is over all pj’s in the range (0, 1).
Since the first (second) term of equation (1) is a continuous and increasing
(decreasing) function of pj’s, the maximization over (pj) is attained only if
the two terms in the minimization are equal. So, equation (1) can be found by
maximizing the first term subject to the constraint that the first and second
terms are equal. In this way, we find that the maximum is attained if and
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only if all pj’s equal 1/2. Hence, by choosing the number of Alice’s agents
N = ⌈log2(1 + 1/ǫ)⌉, the maximum possible successful cheating conditional
probability satisfies
Pr =
1
2N − 1
≤ ǫ. (2)
So, our scheme is perfectly binding for all cheating strategies used by Alice
by utilizing information available after the time maxj 6=k tjk. This completes
our unconditional security proof.
The binding time for this protocol is
tbind = |I| = max(min
ℓ
B0ℓ −max
j 6=k
B0j + B
0
k − |
~Bj − ~Bk|
2
, 0). (3)
Although not all arrangements of Bµj ’s will give a positive binding time, many
of them do. For instance, if all ~Bj’s are distinct and equidistant from ~A, then
Bµj ’s are space-like separated and tbind = minj 6=k |
~Bj − ~Bk|/2 > 0. A more
interesting situation is to put 40 evenly-spaced satellites in the lunar orbit as
agents of Alice and Bob. At any time, Alice on the Earth surface can directly
communicate with 20 such satellites above her horizon by laser beams. The
commitment bit of this setup is about 81 ms and the security parameter
ǫ ≈ 9.5× 10−7.
We remark that the proof makes essential use of NSS and works even
for quantum attacks. Note that the binding time tbind is solely determined
by the events Bµj ’s. The scheme works event if A
µ
j ’s are not close to B
µ
j ’s
and the speed of signal travels along the communication channels is slow
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although Alice will be disadvantaged. We remark that the proof is valid for
Minkowski spacetime and more generally spacetime without closed time-like
curves although the expressions for I and tbind are more complicated. Finally,
we may use multiple communication channels in parallel plus error correction
code in case the channels are noisy. The same proof will go through.
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